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Abstract
Purpose – This research aims to examine the moderating role of CEO power on the relationship between
retrenchment strategy and firm performance by framing the relationship under an agency theory, and power
circulation theory.
Design/methodology/approach – This study focuses on a sample of 319 non-financial public listed
companies in Malaysia from the year 2011–2016 and estimates the model under two-step GMM panel
regression to eliminate the endogeneity issue.
Findings – The results show that the retrenchment strategy increased firm performance. Meanwhile, greater
CEO power changes that retrenchment effect into increased performance. This study also indicates the CEO
power strengthens the relationship between firm performance and retrenchment. However, CEO power does
not have any effect on the performance of low retrenchment, and the performance of big firm size.
Research limitations/implications – The findings show that the higher CEO power cause higher firm
performance and higher retrenchment. This research suggests that CEO power can make retrenchment
strategy works and the decision made can affect the firm performance significantly.
Originality/value – This study examines the effect of CEO power on the performance of retrenchment
strategy implementation by contesting agency theory, power circulation theory, and resource-based view
theory within the emerging country context.
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1. Introduction
There is no consensus in the strategic management literature regarding whether the
implementation of retrenchment strategies enhance or diminish performance. From the
perspective of the resource-based view, a retrenchment strategy is a strategic move of
the organization for performance enhancement (i.e., Abebe, 2009; Goesaert et al., 2015; Barbero
et al., 2017). Conversely, the proponents of agency theory argue that retrenchment strategy will
reduce firm performance due to agency cost (Barbero et al., 2020; Casillas et al., 2019).
Haynes and Hillman (2010) have argued that CEO power may moderate the performance
of strategy implementation, especially if the CEO is powerful vis-a-vis the board. A powerful
CEO threatens the independent judgment of the board (Dalton and Kesner, 1987), and her/his
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